The complete economy, in public.

A protected-supply gacha market for tokenized real-world assets

Economic whitepaper — mainnet beta v0.9 Robinhood Chain · July 2026

This document describes the economics implemented in the guarded mainnet beta. It is not an investment prospectus, a promise of returns, or a security audit. “Protected” means protected by the funded clearing reserve and operational settlement system described below. It does not remove market, token, custody, liquidity, software, legal, or regulatory risk.

Abstract

Stonk World Assets (SWA) turns tokenized stocks, ETFs, commodities, and other real-world assets into transparent onchain packs.

The market has two sides:

• Rippers pay ETH to open packs. Each selected position lets the player keep its tokenized RWA or take its USDG backing.
• Suppliers fund an RWA amount and separate USDG backing. A standard supply becomes ten independently drawable lots; larger direct-token contributions become multiple complete ten-lot rarity batches. Suppliers earn an allocated share of the 3% supplier fee on completed rips.

A separate system-controlled clearing reserve protects supplier principal at its immutable quote-time value. When a lot is selected, the supplier keeps the side the player did not take, receives a USDG reimbursement for the side the player took, and receives accrued supplier fees. New rips stop unless the available reserve plus that pack’s confirmed base can cover the gross worst-case reimbursement for the entire pack.

Pack base price remains the probability-weighted value of the prizes available to players. A 6% markup is split into a 3% supplier fee and 3% protocol fee. The design creates frequent Common outcomes, profitable Uncommon outcomes, and a 5x target Jackpot without making suppliers absorb draw timing risk.

1. Design goals

1. Real player variance: Common outcomes return less than pack price; Uncommon and Jackpot outcomes return more.
2. Published odds: active inventory, backing, prize values, and draw probabilities are visible before payment.
3. Fair base price: before fees, expected player prize value equals the pack base price, subject to rounding and market movement.
4. Protected supplier principal: a selected supplier receives the unselected side plus reserve reimbursement for the selected side’s snapshotted USDG value.
5. Fee-based supplier earnings: supplier profit comes from the disclosed 3% supplier fee, not from taking the opposite side of player outcomes.
6. Voluntary exit: active positions remain withdrawable unless temporarily locked into an unexpired, paid, drawn, or settling rip.
7. Fail-closed solvency: the protocol does not draw a rip until its base has reached the reserve and the reserve can cover its gross worst-case supplier claim.

2. Economic actors

2.1 Ripper

A ripper:

• pays the quoted pack total in native ETH;
• receives odds fixed in an expiring quote;
• receives a reproducible random selection after payment confirms;
• chooses the selected RWA lot or its USDG backing;
• bears the 6% markup and draw variance.

2.2 Supplier

A supplier:

• funds an exact RWA lot and separately accounted USDG backing;
• receives one or more complete sets of ten independently drawable rarity tranches;
• earns a risk-weighted share of the 3% supplier fee;
• can withdraw both exact principal assets and accrued fees while active and unlocked;
• if selected, receives the unselected principal asset plus USDG reimbursement for the selected asset’s snapshotted value.

Supplier earnings depend on rip volume and pool share. They are not a fixed yield, APY, or promise of profit.

2.3 Clearing reserve

The clearing reserve:

• receives pack base payments after a rip settles;
• reimburses selected suppliers in USDG;
• retains Common-outcome surpluses;
• absorbs Uncommon and Jackpot shortfalls;
• is held in a dedicated system-controlled Privy wallet;
• cannot be counted as supplier-owned capital.

2.4 Protocol

The protocol:

• admits supported assets during the guarded beta;
• produces and validates bounded swap routes;
• maintains quotes, lots, draws, liabilities, and the reserve ledger;
• receives 3% of the pack base;
• pauses new rips when any economy or reserve guard fails.

3. Supplier positions

Each supplier funds:

• \(A_i\): an exact quantity of an allowlisted RWA;
• \(M_i\): the executable USDG value of that RWA quantity;
• \(B_i\): separately held USDG backing;
• \(V_i\): the maximum value the player can claim.

Vᵢ = max(Mᵢ, Bᵢ)

A standard supply batch is divided into ten conserved tranches:

• eight Common tranches;
• one profitable Uncommon tranche;
• one Jackpot tranche.

RWA amount, backing, and prize value are split using 208,919 proportional units: 12,262 units for each Common tranche, 20,723 for Uncommon, and 90,100 for Jackpot. The split neither creates nor removes assets.

The target complete-batch profile is:

Final odds and multipliers are calculated from the complete live pool. They are not hard-coded promises for an individual deposit.

When a supplier contributes tokens already held in their wallet, the system uses the larger of RWA market value and backing to size the contribution into approximately 25 USDG prize-value batches. Each batch independently repeats the same eight/one/one rarity structure. A single transaction can create up to 25 batches (250 lots); larger amounts must be submitted as multiple contributions. The nested split is lossless in atomic units.

4. Valuation

The beta obtains \(M_i\) from an executable exact-input RWA-to-USDG Uniswap quote across supported Robinhood Chain liquidity. It values the exact token amount held by the position, not one whole share.

The quote is a liquidity value, not guaranteed issuer NAV. It can differ from the reference market because of liquidity depth, route fees, price impact, token trading restrictions, issuer events, market hours, and quote latency.

The selected-side reimbursement uses the immutable value stored in the paid rip snapshot:

• if the player keeps the RWA, reimbursement is snapshotted \(M_i\);
• if the player takes backing, reimbursement is exact \(B_i\).

This prevents the reimbursement amount from being changed after the random result is known. It also means the supplier retains post-snapshot price risk: later appreciation, depreciation, depegging, freezes, and corporate actions are not corrected by the reserve.

5. Odds and rarity

For legacy unprofiled positions, positive backing produces inverse weight:

wᵢ = K / Bᵢ
pᵢ = wᵢ / Σⱼwⱼ

where \(K = 10^{36}\).

Current ten-lot batches store explicit weights calibrated to the 85/10/5 profile. Across the live pool:

pᵢ = stored weightᵢ / Σⱼstored weightⱼ

Higher-value chase tranches carry lower stored draw weight. Any new or removed batch changes aggregate probabilities and the pack price.

6. Pack pricing

Expected claimable player value is:

E = Σᵢ(pᵢ × Vᵢ)

For \(n\) pulls:

Base(n) = n × E

When every \(V_i = B_i\), the expression reduces to the harmonic mean:

E = N / Σᵢ(1 / Bᵢ)

The live implementation is a generalized harmonic model because the claimable RWA value can exceed backing.

Fair expectation does not mean a 1:1 outcome. At the target profile, 85% of single pulls are Common losses, 10% are profitable Uncommon pulls, and 5% are Jackpots.

7. Fees and player return

Supplier fee = ceil(Base × 3%)
Protocol fee = ceil(Base × 3%)
Pack total   = Base + Supplier fee + Protocol fee

Ignoring atomic-unit rounding:

Pack total = 1.06 × Base
Player RTP = 1 / 1.06 ≈ 94.34%
Gross player-spend edge ≈ 5.66%

“6% fee” means a 6% markup on fair base value. Each 3% component is approximately 2.83% of gross player spend.

Payment flow:

Base          → clearing reserve
Supplier fee  → exposed suppliers
Protocol fee  → protocol fee wallet

8. Supplier fee allocation

Position \(i\)'s expected prize contribution is:

rᵢ = pᵢ × Vᵢ
sᵢ = rᵢ / Σⱼrⱼ

For each completed rip:

Supplier fee accrualᵢ = sᵢ × Supplier fee

A position with more expected prize exposure earns a larger share of the supplier fee. The allocation is made across every position in the paid odds snapshot, not only the selected position.

Unlike the previous beta model, pack base is not supplier profit. It capitalizes the clearing reserve that protects selected principal.

9. What a supplier earns

The supplier’s modeled earnings are the allocated supplier fees:

Earnings per completed ripᵢ = sᵢ × (3% × Base)

If the pool remains unchanged for \(R\) completed rips:

Estimated cumulative feesᵢ = R × sᵢ × (3% × Base)

This amount changes with inventory, valuation, odds, pack size, and supplier competition. Zero rips produce zero new fees. A selected tranche exits the pool, while unselected tranches continue accruing fees.

The UI presents an estimate per completed one-pack rip. It does not annualize the estimate or call it guaranteed yield.

10. How supplier principal protection works

Before selection, the supplier owns two principals:

Marked principalᵢ = Mᵢ + Bᵢ

If selected:

Therefore, at the immutable snapshot mark:

Supplier settlement value =
  unselected principal
  + selected-side reimbursement
  + accrued supplier fees

The reserve eliminates draw-timing loss only if it is sufficiently funded and the custody and settlement system performs correctly. It does not guarantee a specific fiat value or future token price.

11. What a supplier can still lose

The protected model materially reduces one risk: an early Jackpot selection no longer makes the individual supplier absorb the Jackpot shortfall.

It does not remove:

• RWA price movement between valuation and settlement;
• missed upside after an RWA is converted into fixed USDG reimbursement;
• USDG depeg, freeze, or issuer risk;
• tokenized-asset freezes, rebases, corporate actions, or transfer restrictions;
• valuation manipulation or stale DEX quotes;
• custody wallet, Privy policy, authorization-key, database, or worker failure;
• reserve underfunding caused by bugs, compromise, or unreconciled transfers;
• transaction failure, chain reorganization, RPC outage, or gas exhaustion;
• insufficient rip volume to generate meaningful fees;
• tax, legal, and regulatory exposure.

“Principal protected” is therefore a bounded system property, not a risk-free investment claim.

12. Reserve economics

For a selected lot, define reimbursement \(C_i\) as the value of the side the player takes. A rational player chooses \(V_i\), so:

Expected reimbursement = Σᵢ(pᵢ × Vᵢ) = E
Base inflow             = E
Expected reserve change = 0 before rounding and market movement

Realized reserve change is intentionally variable:

Reserve change = Base - selected reimbursement

• Common pulls usually add surplus.
• Uncommon pulls consume some accumulated surplus.
• Jackpot pulls consume the largest amount.

This variance is pooled in the protocol reserve instead of being assigned to the selected supplier.

Gross coverage guard

For \(n\) pulls, the beta sorts every eligible lot by \(V_i\), takes the \(n\) largest values, and requires:

Available reserve + confirmed pack base
≥ sum(n largest eligible prize values)

Available reserve is:

Onchain reserve USDG
- pending, submitted, or retrying reserve payout obligations
- worst-case reimbursement for every drawn result awaiting a player choice

The player’s ETH checkout delivers an exact USDG payment to the inventory wallet. The full pack base is then transferred to the reserve and confirmed before entropy selection. Only the confirmed base counts toward coverage; supplier and protocol fees do not. If the post-payment reserve remains short, the draw does not proceed.

Only checkout and randomness selection are serialized. As soon as a winner is drawn and its lot is removed from active inventory, the next checkout can begin—even while earlier players are choosing their payout or receiving it. Every unresolved choice reserves its selected lot’s worst-case reimbursement, so this concurrency cannot oversubscribe the clearing reserve. New quotes stop if reserve coverage or reserve gas is insufficient.

13. Worked one-pack example

Normalize gross pack price to 1 USDG:

Expected prize / Base = 0.9434 USDG
Supplier fee          = 0.0283 USDG
Protocol fee          = 0.0283 USDG
Pack total            = 1.0000 USDG

If Common is selected, the reserve receives 0.9434 and reimburses 0.6805, retaining approximately 0.2629. If Jackpot is selected, it receives 0.9434 and reimburses 5.0000, using approximately 4.0566 of pre-funded reserve capital.

The selected supplier does not bear either result. The supplier receives the other principal side, the selected-side reimbursement, and accrued fees.

14. Supplier withdrawal

An active supplier can sign a withdrawal authorization from Portfolio. Settlement returns:

• the exact active RWA lot;
• full active USDG backing;
• accrued supplier fees;
• any honored legacy base-revenue balance from the earlier beta model.

“Withdraw all active” exits every currently eligible tranche in a batch with one wallet signature.

A lot is temporarily locked if it appears in an unexpired or paid rip snapshot. This prevents withdrawal after odds have been sold. Once the draw is made, unselected lots become eligible again immediately; the selected lot is removed from active inventory and closes through protected settlement.

15. Inventory consumption and replenishment

Every completed pull consumes one child lot. One supplier batch creates ten child lots, so it can support up to ten selections if none are withdrawn. Unselected siblings remain active.

The pool is replenished when suppliers create new positions. More supply:

• adds drawable inventory;
• changes aggregate pack price and odds;
• increases gross reserve coverage required for the largest possible packs;
• dilutes supplier-fee allocation across additional expected prize exposure.

16. Economy-readiness guard

For gross per-pull price \(G\):

Common:   Vᵢ ≤ G
Uncommon: G < Vᵢ < 2G
Jackpot:  Vᵢ ≥ 2G

Every complete supplier batch targets:

Σ p(Common)   = 85%
Σ p(Uncommon) = 10%
Σ p(Jackpot)  = 5%

When a lot is drawn it leaves the pool, so the remaining probabilities renormalize until suppliers replenish inventory. Freezing the pool immediately after one Common draw would make multi-rip operation impractical. The runtime depletion guard therefore keeps ripping open only while every tier exists and:

Σ p(Uncommon)            ≤ 14%
Σ p(Jackpot)             ≤ 7%
Σ p(Uncommon + Jackpot)  ≤ 20%

These are safety ceilings, not advertised target odds. Every paid quote stores and displays the exact live probabilities used for that rip.

17. Multi-pull packs

Packs support one, three, or five pulls when inventory permits. Selection is without replacement.

The beta prices:

Base(n) = n × E(initial snapshot)

Reserve coverage is more conservative: it covers the sum of the \(n\) largest eligible prize values. A later version should calculate exact sequential without-replacement expected value for multi-pull pricing.

18. ETH funding and slippage

Users interact with native ETH while inventory accounting uses RWA tokens and USDG.

Supply with ETH

The interface builds two exact-output purchases:

1. ETH for the exact RWA quantity;
2. ETH for the exact USDG backing.

Each supply route has a hard 1% maximum slippage bound. Both outputs go directly to the inventory wallet and are verified before activation.

Supply tokens already held

The supplier can instead transfer an exact allowlisted token amount directly to the inventory wallet. The interface then builds only the exact-output ETH purchase for USDG backing. The direct ERC-20 transfer has no swap slippage; the backing purchase retains the hard 1% maximum slippage bound. Activation waits for both exact transfers to confirm.

The 0.01 ETH supplier minimum is checked against the executable ETH-equivalent value of the contributed token plus backing, rather than only the ETH spent on the backing transaction.

Rip

The ripper uses an exact-output ETH route that delivers the fixed USDG pack total to the inventory wallet. Unused ETH is refunded by the router. Gas is separate.

19. Custody, accounting, and settlement

The beta uses three system-controlled Privy wallets:

• inventory wallet: active RWA, backing, supplier fees, and incoming rip payments;
• supplier-protection reserve: reserve USDG used only for supplier reimbursements;
• protocol fee wallet: protocol revenue.

PostgreSQL stores immutable quotes, odds snapshots, transfer receipts, draw results, supplier choices, withdrawal authorizations, payout obligations, reserve ledger entries, idempotency keys, and audit events.

Protected settlement first confirms the checkout and pack-base transfer to the reserve. Only then does it select winners. It subsequently creates deterministic obligations for:

1. the player’s selected principal;
2. the supplier’s unselected principal;
3. accrued supplier fees;
4. reserve reimbursement to the supplier;
5. protocol fee transfer.

Operational solvency requires:

Inventory RWA ≥ active lots + pending RWA obligations

Inventory USDG ≥
  active backing
  + accrued supplier fees
  + pending inventory-wallet USDG obligations

Reserve USDG ≥
  pending reserve reimbursements
  + required coverage for any sellable quote

20. Randomness

The beta commits to a hidden server seed before payment and combines it with a future confirmed Robinhood Chain block hash. Commitment, revealed seed, block hash, and derived randomness make the result reproducible.

This is verifiable commit-and-future-block randomness, not Chainlink VRF. A custodial operator can still censor or delay settlement. A supported decentralized randomness source remains a production priority.

21. Current parameter table

The 0.005 ETH figure is a target, not a fixed price. Live price changes with inventory, backing, valuations, odds, fees, and the ETH/USDG route.

22. SWA token

The live SWA token is the verified PonsLauncherToken deployment at 0x1269c2a29c0624fa27a11e54ef754b59bc083ee9. It has 18 decimals and a fixed one-billion-token supply. The launch contract imposed canonical-pool purchase restrictions for its first two blocks; that restriction window has expired.

SWA has executable Robinhood Chain routes through its WETH V3 pool. The mainnet beta accepts SWA through both supplier paths: an exact-output ETH purchase or a direct SWA transfer with separately purchased USDG backing. Direct contributions are divided into as many as 25 complete ten-lot rarity batches. ETH-funded SWA positions are capped at 5,000,000 SWA per deposit, and all system-built purchases retain the hard 1% maximum-slippage rule.

23. Trust and future work

This is a trusted custodial beta. The formulas do not protect users from a compromised database, Privy authorization key, wallet policy, worker, operator, RPC, token contract, or legal process.

Before larger balances, priorities include:

1. independent custody, economic, and application audits;
2. continuous onchain liability reconciliation and alerting;
3. independent oracle bounds around DEX valuations;
4. exact multi-pull pricing;
5. reserve stress simulation and public reserve reporting;
6. decentralized randomness;
7. migration from custodial settlement to audited onchain escrow where practical.

Conclusion

SWA separates the two economic jobs that were previously mixed together:

• suppliers provide real RWA and backing inventory and earn the 3% supplier fee;
• the clearing reserve absorbs draw variance and reimburses selected supplier principal;
• rippers receive genuine Common, Uncommon, and Jackpot outcomes;
• the protocol receives its disclosed 3% fee.

The reserve does not make the product risk-free. It makes the main draw risk explicit, pooled, pre-funded, and fail-closed: no new rip is sold unless the reserve can cover the gross worst eligible outcome.